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A THEOLOGIAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON 
SCIENCE- ENGAGED THEOLOGY
CARMODY GREY
What we talk about when we talk about ‘science’
Peter Harrison’s 2011 Gifford Lectures, published under the title The Territories of Science 
and Religion, surely count as the single most helpful intervention in the field of ‘religion 
and science’ since that conversation got seriously underway. Thanks to Harrison, inter-
locutors could look away from the quest for typologies and taxonomies and towards 
a scrutiny of the terms themselves. ‘Religion’ and ‘science’, Harrison argued, date in 
their current usage only to the nineteenth century. Using the terms to refer to timeless 
categories of knowledge makes no sense. Seeking to frame, in general terms, the rela-
tionship between something called ‘religion’ and something called ‘science’ is therefore 
a pursuit of questionable utility.
As the editors of this issue explain in their introduction, the Science- Engaged Theology 
project intends to take Harrison’s argument as a point of departure. If we cannot ask 
about ‘religion’ (or ‘theology’) and ‘science’ in generic terms, then surely one helpful 
thing we can do is bring a new emphasis on specificity to the enquiry: how does this bit 
of science make a difference in that bit of theology? This granularity is potent. In turning 
away from the pursuit of a panoramic view of the whole, Science- Engaged Theology 
invites theologians to a patient attentiveness to specific aspects of how various sciences 
describe and analyse the world, and a willingness to hear and respond to the questions 
this raises for theology. The enquiries in this issue represent attempts to do just that. 
But does Science- Engaged Theology successfully follow through on the key content of 
Harrison’s proposal: the effort to de- essentialise ‘science’ and ‘religion’?
In this short response, I want to raise a concern about Science- Engaged Theology, but 
it is a fond concern, and its raising is meant appreciatively. The appreciation, with due 
qualification, comes below. First, I outline my worry: does Science- Engaged Theology 
make itself a hostage to the very circumstances which prompted Harrison to undertake 
his critique?
Science- Engaged Theology is still operating with the terms whose employ-
ment Harrison’s historicisation has cast into question. The editors stipulate that 
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Science- Engaged Theology is not in competition with what they, following Harrison 
himself, call Theology- Engaged Science, which seeks to disinter the theological and 
metaphysical dimensions of the practice of modern natural sciences. But the categories 
used in both these labels presuppose the very terms that Harrison problematises. To 
what extent is the editors’ way of naming this family of enquiries begging the question, 
hiding the problem under cover of addressing it? Yes, the project invites us to move 
away from generalised meanings of these terms towards looking at how science and 
theology manifest as particular claims, approaches, and so on. But the same terms are 
still used: ‘theology . . . and the natural and social sciences,’ for example, as the editors’ 
quote from Surin puts it. In each article, some logic operates which allows the identifi-
cation of distinct partners in discourse, a theological and a scientific, so that a point of 
contention, question or illumination can be discovered in the space between. It is this 
‘space between’ which is implied in Science- Engaged Theology’s notion of ‘entangled 
concepts’. Such concepts are entangled between, or across, what domains? Is there not a 
supposition here of territories alongside one another— as implied by the ‘and’ of Surin’s 
quote? If we are trying to enter a post- essentialist age in relation to science and religion, 
this is a framing of the project that calls for question.
One may respond to this complaint that there are no obvious substitutes for the terms 
‘science’ and ‘religion’/‘theology’; we must work with the language we have. It is true 
that there are no good substitutes. But the penultimacy of enquiry generated by the pend-
ing of more adequate terms, and the awkwardness of conversation in the meantime, is 
part of creative intellectual evolution.
But surely we can use the terms while trying to interrogate them, can we not? Only if 
we bring to light the rules guiding their use. A metaphor illuminates this. The terms ‘re-
ligion’ and ‘science’ in contemporary usage are pawns moved around on a chessboard 
that no- one sees. The way the squares are laid out on the board determines what can 
move where. That chessboard is the background understanding of ‘world’ or ‘reality’ 
by which we identify and categorise ‘knowledge’. Theology, as explicit discourse about 
ultimacy, has the particular burden of bringing that chessboard to light. Not to prove 
it ‘wrong’— whatever that would mean, for it is the rules which determine ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ that are here considered— but to show what rules are governing the game, what 
sort of moves this chessboard legislates for, so that they can be seen and evaluated. 
What moves can be made, by whom, with what significance, can then be understood.
Analysing the moves made by pieces discretely and by themselves does not allow us 
to focus on what is at stake in the way ‘science’ and ‘religion’ function in contemporary 
usage. Moves made by individual pieces need to be analysed as having been made pos-
sible by the board they are on. How useful is it to investigate what happens when the 
Queen moves against the Bishop apart from a consideration of how the functions and 
identities of those pieces are determined by a prior structure? It is, one might answer, 
useful within the terms of the game; but surely what is at stake in the intersection of 
issues in the field of ‘religion and science’ is really about how the game of knowledge is 
played? The knowledge- claims (the moves and functions of the pieces) only have sense, 
purchase and truth- value in that context.
For what is really at stake here is, simply, what the world is, and (therefore) what 
knowledge of that world consists in. It is here that the credibility of any kind of ‘theo-
logical’ account is saved or lost; it is here that the validity at all of God- talk— and there-
fore the existence of anything to engage ‘science’ with— is established or disestablished. 
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Given that a number of the articles in this issue have a clearly apologetic dimension, 
and Science- Engaged Theology is intending to express that ‘new boldness’ that Kathryn 
Tanner names and celebrates, this is not otiose to the project. It is in that space also 
that a framework for the interpretation and adjudication of the moves on the chessboard 
can successfully take place, an interpretation and adjudication which Science- Engaged 
Theology necessarily undertakes; it is this that the notion of ‘engagement’, among other 
things, identifies. Are we— those who attempt to think Christianly— not better off effort-
fully bringing the chessboard to light, so we understand what it means for the Queen 
to move against the Bishop in just this way? For example, when a notion of ‘evolved 
dispositions’ is brought against classical moral theologies of culpability (Pedersen)?
Seeing the chessboard is an eliminably historical enterprise, which is why an histo-
rian of science was, in the end, better able to make a decisive contribution to the field 
than many of us who work directly in it as theologians. But here again, Science- Engaged 
Theology may not be carrying this accent through adequately. Its ‘theological puzzles’, 
despite their specificity, do not escape being (albeit implicitly) normative, because of the 
lack of an explicitly historical framing. If we cannot ask about the relationship between 
religion and science except for particular people in a specific time and a place, with ref-
erence to particular concerns, then the relativisation of the terms by their histories must 
be a defining aspect of the way the conversation is conducted. The implied normativity, 
the lack of historicisation, in the use of these labels by Science- Engaged Theology per-
petuates the binary which Harrison’s work questions.
What is going on in the conversation about ‘religion’ and ‘science’ in the twenty- 
first century precedes specific engagements both conceptually and historically. Does 
Science- Engaged Theology lay out its pieces on a chessboard which so shapes the game 
that the moves made simply play out pre- established patterns? The project then repro-
duces the problem Harrison identifies: the essentialisation of ‘religion’ and ‘science’.
‘The Empirical’
Science- Engaged Theology takes its theological departure from Alvin Plantinga’s re-
mark: ‘The world as God created it is full of contingencies. Therefore we do not merely 
think about it in our armchairs, trying to infer from first principles how many teeth 
there are in a horse’s mouth; instead we take a look. The same should go for the ques-
tion how God acts in the world.’1 Science- Engaged Theology supposes, therefore, that 
theology rightly draws on empirical research, what we can learn from our senses, tak-
ing it as an authentic theological source.
The warrant for this assertion is hardly arguable. Christian thought starts from 
contingencies: creation, and the first and second covenants. It is a sign of how net-
tled Christian reflection has been by the force of modern ‘natural sciences’ that this 
needs to be stated in this way, as though expecting contestation. There is no sense in 
theology being shy of the deliverances of the senses, given that almost no theological 
tradition is interested in denying creation and history as a source of the knowledge of 
God. Science- Engaged Theology is right to draw emphatic attention to this and to ask 
us to take seriously the implications for theological enquiry. All our speaking of God is 
1 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Methodological Naturalism?’, Origins and Design 18 (1997). Online: https://www.arn.
org/docs/odesi gn/od181/ methn at181.htm.
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from the vantage of creatures, and there is nothing especially surprising about this from 
any point of view. We know that language is, to an unknown extent, metaphorical, that 
we constantly speak by speaking of things other than what we are speaking of (can we 
ever speak ‘literally’?). The effort by Science- Engaged Theology to explore the way in 
which (what we call) ‘science’ can become part of that rich store of image, metaphor and 
analogy is an important one: ‘the stretching of words across different uses’, as the edi-
tors, and Andrew Davison helpfully clarify. Inviting attention to this store is a worthy 
purpose, and the articles in this issue indicate its fruits.
If Science- Engaged Theology is merely saying this— that we should look at the world, 
touch it, feel it, sniff it, taste it, listen to it; and that we should expect such experiences 
to have some relation to the one behind, beneath, before and in the world— then it is a 
salutary truism, but a truism nevertheless. But Science- Engaged Theology is not quite 
saying this, or not only saying this. When it adds the rider ‘research’ to that apparently 
innocent word ‘empirical’, the issue at hand becomes clearer.
The question is not whether Christian reflection should take material things, experi-
ences and happenings as grist to its mill. It cannot not do so. Why shouldn’t ‘scientific’ 
terms and concepts enter the theological storehouse? Christian discourse is largely com-
posed of images from mundane spheres: farming, war, family life, law, sport and so on. 
No, the question is what way of constructing ‘the empirical’ is at work in science, and 
how its ‘findings’ reflect that construction. For modern natural sciences are not just an-
other domain of terms, concepts and sensory experience, indistinguishable in principle 
from farming, hunting, war and family life (which, as we know, also call for scrutiny as 
worlds of language use). The category of ‘the empirical’ expresses this difference.
What chessboard does the term ‘empirical’ move on? The category expresses a way 
of carving up the world that governs what we will find when we bring our senses to it. 
Does the term invisibly carry the supposition of a discretely identifiable, bounded do-
main? (This is a troublesome feature of the conceptualisation of theological sources alto-
gether. The metaphor implies both externality and stability.) We know that what people 
experience with their senses is by no means secure or stable; what counts as sensible, as 
‘empirical’, is contested.2 As John Milbank has argued in this journal, even so confirmed 
an ‘empiricist’ as David Hume did not deliver a stable account of what ‘the empirical’ 
is.3 On the contrary, he seemed at least as interested in mystifying it, and that in a salu-
tary fashion. We cannot simply legitimise (what we call) science’s ‘findings’, as they are 
put to theology, by re- naming them as ‘empirical’ and hoping that they magically gain 
clarity, availability and measurability. (These are the properties we associate with the 
word ‘data’, a word which after all means ‘given’, claiming an obviousness or non- 
contestability which should itself draw suspicion.)
This questionability of the category of ‘the empirical’ is hidden by the decision to take 
‘empirical research’ as a ‘source’ for theology. Questioning the category does not mean 
that ‘empirical research’ should be ignored, but it does mean that when ‘empirical re-
search’ is taken to ‘put questions to theology’, those questions need to be seen as gener-
ated by the chessboard on which the game is played. The Queen moves to D7 because 
D7 has been designated as moveable- into. A bishop moves to C5 because bishops are 
defined in this game as the sort of piece that can go to that square. The question of 
‘method’ cannot be suspended. Modern natural science is not a set of facts that can be 
2 Daniel Everett, Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes (London: Profile Books, 2010).
3 John Milbank, ‘Hume Versus Kant: Faith, Reason and Feeling’, Modern Theology 27, no. 2 (April 2011): 
276- 97.
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separated from their context and imported into other domains. It is a set of methods; 
and the methods make (facere) the facts (facti).4
Even were we to accept the term ‘empirical’ as a circumscribed and self- evident do-
main, (what we call) ‘science’ is not merely empirical. The phrase ‘empirical research’ as 
used in the project statements of Science- Engaged Theology is an implicit recognition of 
this; but ‘research’ is here hiding the term ‘method’. ‘Science’ puts questions to theology, 
yes, just as experience puts questions to theology, just as history and events do. Paying 
attention to those questions is important. But what does (what we call) ‘natural science’ 
add, beyond simply ‘the findings of the senses’ (whatever they are)? For modern natural 
science is precisely not just the findings of the senses, nor is it simply their amplifica-
tion, or extension. It is well known that ‘science’ routinely generates entirely counterin-
tuitive conclusions, inviting people to consent to what their senses alone could never in 
any circumstances ‘find’. Some sciences, like quantum physics, not only go beyond ‘the 
findings of the senses’, but flatly contradict them. Others, such as the claim that our gal-
axy is moving through space at 5.8 kilometres per second, may not offend our senses, 
but it is almost meaningless to them. None of us has ever seen the Milky Way ‘from the 
outside’, nor does any of us have the measure of the space ‘through which’ it is moving. 
(In)famously, no- one has actually seen a chimpanzee turn into a human.
The instruments that science uses, the procedures of analysis and the modes of expla-
nation that it employs, do not neutrally extend what we sense, but interpret and shape 
it. The slipperiness of the term ‘fact’, which is in our time the currency of the empirical, 
is evidence of this. This is not in itself (at all) to question the legitimacy of scientific 
claims. (To what ‘non- interpretive’ mode of understanding could natural science be 
unfavourably compared in this regard?) It is simply to note that (what we call) science 
is not merely ‘the findings of the senses’, where ‘findings’ implies that we simply came 
upon whatever it is while casually looking, as a certain William Paley accidentally stum-
bled over a watch ‘in crossing a heath’. Scientific theories and claims are synthesised 
through a complex process of theoretical construction, including the selection of top-
ics for enquiry; the categorisation of phenomena into classes; the operation of axioms, 
some examined, some not; diverse modes of analysis; various means of turning expe-
rience into measurable units; and a set of (contested) criteria for what counts as a good 
explanation. This ‘extra’ that science adds to the senses, which qualifies, modulates or 
interprets them, is what the rider ‘research’ quietly adds to the troublesome ‘empirical’.
So, the Science- Engaged Theologian responds: does not all this simply move the con-
versation back into the realm of the abstract, the conceptual, and the generic?— 
sacrificing in doing this the specificity, the granularity, that Science- Engaged Theology 
has (rightly) identified as one worthy response to the Harrison platform? No, or at least, 
not necessarily. Samir Okasha is not alone in observing that there is no single ‘scientific 
method’.5 Attending to method does not automatically entail panoramic thinking, with 
its potential for grandstanding, sweeping generalisations, too- vague categories, and the 
universals SCIENCE and RELIGION mincing seductively in again through the 
4 Plantinga’s remark begs this question when he puts looking for a horse’s teeth alongside looking for 
God’s acts in the world, as though these were distinct acts of enquiry. The teeth in the horse’s mouth are an act 
of God. Without wishing to short- circuit the old chestnut of special divine action, the fact that Plantinga dis-
tinguishes in this way makes clear the advantages of a more Thomist way of putting it: we know God in ev-
erything we know. There is no knowledge act that is not knowledge of God (though there are different types 
of knowledge).
5 A position he states as uncontroversial in introducing the topic to newcomers. Samir Okasha, Philosophy 
of Science: A Very Short Introduction, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 1.
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backdoor. No, the granularity will not be lost, but it will have a different note: it will be 
also methodological; it will look at what is making knowledge ‘knowledge’ in any given 
instance, and it will bring that awareness into its reception of the discipline and the 
‘findings’ under discussion. This attention to method allows the scholar to ask: what is 
it we are talking about when we are talking about science? A responsible theology will 
not let this question be external to the reception of ‘science’s’ ‘findings’. What does 
method look like in this ‘science’? How does it generate these outcomes? What can be 
said about that, critically or affirmatively, from the point of view of one who sees a 
‘more’ in reality intruding everywhere (God)?
Simply: there would be a way of doing Science- Engaged Theology that did not, contra 
the instructions of the editors to their writers in this issue, specifically shelve method.
Of course, there is no keeping science ‘out of’ theology. We cannot positivistically 
delimit certain kinds of knowledge as regulating all the others, because our speaking of 
God is taken from creatures, and it is God we know in everything we know. Isolation of 
the theological from the ‘scientific’ is impossible. The whole, as D.L. Schindler ex-
plained, intrudes into every part; the universal into every particular; the conceptualisa-
tion of the world as such into every conceptualisation of what is in the world.6 We make 
a claim to knowing everything in any claim to know anything.
Ironically, the Science- Engaged Theology project, by attempting to bring science into 
‘theology’, cannot help generating the impression that it is, could be, has ever been, 
‘out’ . But this is to mislocate what is problematic in our time. What needs defence now, 
for us (post)moderns, is not the proposal that ‘science’ be allowed inside ‘theology’. It 
already is. What is needed is a cogent challenge to the innocent assumption that it is, 
could be, or has ever been, ‘outside’.
6 D.L. Schindler, ‘The Given as Gift: Creation and Disciplinary Abstraction in Science’, Communio 38, no. 1 
(Spring 2011): 52- 102.
